



To make the American lawyer aware of tactics for negotiating with the
Japanese I have chosen to present a typical problem with which an in-house
counsel for an American corporation might be confronted. During research
on inter-satellite transmission of data, the research and development (R and
D) department of CST Systems, a satellite communications firm, perfected
an electronics design which enables them to produce stereo speakers which
utilize a wireless transmission principle. After further research, the R and
D department designed an entire line of audio products based on this wire-
less transmission principle. The prototypes have been tested and their per-
formance was just slight of astonishing; so good, in fact, that some
corporate officials see this concept as revolutionizing the market. A final
manufacturing process has been developed on paper.
The November 20, 1981 issue of Electro Developments ran a technical
article on the wireless transmission principle and its application to satellites.
Yosuki Nakamura, a member of the Japanese External Trade Organization
(JETRO), read the article and saw the implication for use of the principle in
the stereo industry. Without the schematic diagram for the design, how-
ever, Nakamura and his company, the Yoshimura Keiretsu, would be
unable to use the design.
Attempting to buy the technology for the manufacture of stereos,
Yoshimura sent a telegram to the purchasing department of CST Systems
informing them of their interest in the wireless transmission process and
offering CST Systems $2 million for the schematic diagrams. CST has
delayed answering. Though CST Systems desires to manufacture its own
line of stereos, they realize the problems of domestic manufacturing and
have entertained the idea of manufacturing the line in Japan. Both logisti-
cally and economically manufacture in Japan would be a much smarter
plan of action.
*Mr. Watts is a financial counselor in Florida.
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At a board meeting, the directors unanimously agreed that CST Systems
could capture a large portion of the world stereo market by manufacturing
and marketing its newly designed line of stereo equipment. They decided
that Japan would be the ideal spot for manufacturing and that, if amenable,
some kind of joint venture with Yoshimura would benefit both companies.
As in-house counsel for CST Systems, you must now determine what
type of business entity and procedures would best suit the needs of CST and
Yoshimura. As the business must be erected in Japan, you are now faced
with negotiating an agreement with a Japanese company which apparently
would prefer to buy or license the technology rather than take on a manu-
facturing partner. You have never been to Japan but you have heard about
the proverbially inscrutable mind of the East Asian. Where do you begin?
Historical-Legal Background
To the same extent that individuals can be said to be a product of their
culture, we may say that a culture is the product of its history. Due to its
proximity to the Chinese-Russian mainland, we find these cultural influ-
ences leaving traces. However, unmistakably there exist specific internal
ethnic forces which are the key to the Japanese mind. These specific forces
include a close community of thinking traceable back to the relative isola-
tion of the islands. The Japanese people over the years maintained a highly
homogeneous ethnic cohesion. Near the end of the fourth century there
occurred an invasion of the islands by inhabitants of what is today known
as Manchuria. As the Manchurians settled in the south of Japan and
moved toward the central region, the native Japanese were driven to the
north. Even today, with the high degree of homogeneity notwithstanding,
there are discernable differences between a northern and a southern Japa-
nese. The LeSenne School has developed a process of characterological
analysis whereby different mentalities within a country are identified. The
analysis uses fundamental elements of character as criteria. Of the eight
main elements identified by the research Japan possesses three. The native
Japanese who preponderate in the North (Honshu and Hokkaido) were
characterized as sentimental (EnAS) or emotional, not active and secon-
dary.2 The southerner's profile was nervous (EnAP): emotional, not active
and primary. Finally, the original Manchurians were classified as choleric
(EAP): emotional, active and primary. This last group, according to the
'To complete the triad I must mention that laws are then the product of the individuals.
2The fundamental elements of the LeSenne criteria are Emotionality (E), Activity (A) and
Reverberation (R). The final category is the manner in which the subject responds to external
stimuli. P or primary describes one who reacts promptly. S or secondary describes one who
reacts after pondering the stimuli. The subject can be emotional (E) or not (nE), active (A) or
not (nA) and primary (P) or secondary (S). Eight character types result: nervous (EnAP);
sentimental (EnAS); choleric (EAP); passionate (EAS); sanguine (nEAP); phlegmatic (nEAS);
amorphous (nEnAP); apathetic (nEAS). This synopsis is from Diferent Conceptions of the
Law, 2 INT'L ENCYCLOPEDIA COMP. L. 122 (1975).
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study were generally found to be the leaders and merchants of the
Japanese.
One of the primary influences on the Japanese character can be traced to
the influx of Chinese culture in the fifth century A.D. As Confucianism was
the philosophical mainstay of the time, laws initiated then have a clear
Confucian basis. In 604 A.D. the Jushichi Kempo or the Seventeenth Maxim
were given to the people by the royal prince-regent Umaydo. The maxims
were a short code of political and social morality. To illustrate, the fourth
maxim counseled ministers and functionaries to always act with decorum.
Acting in a proprietous manner showed the clear distinctions of rank and in
this way vassals were not confused. This same principle, a cornerstone of
the Confucian philosophy, still influences the Japanese today and is a criti-
cal factor in decision-making and negotiating.
Not surprisingly, the period from 600 A.D. to 1868 looks much like the
development of the European feudal system. Power began to concentrate
in the hands of a few families. In 1603 the first permanent state of political
equilibrium emerged. Tokugawa Iyeyasu organized a central, federalized
government with a controlling military class. He also closed the islands to
foreign intercourse. For some 250 years Japan remained isolated, trading
exclusively, with the Dutch and Chinese. Under this feudal system the
Tokugawa gave the land barons (daimyos) power to administer justice
within their fiefdoms. This began the positive law system in Japan. Justice
during this period was marked by the:
... tendency (of Japanese justice) to consider all the circumstances of individual
cases, to confide the relaxation of principles to judicial discretion, to balance the
benefits and disadvantages of a given course, not for all time in a fixed rule, but
anew in each instance . . . to make justice personal.3
In 1853 Admiral Perry of the United States steamed into Japan, guns
loaded, and forcefully broke Japan's long isolation. By 1868 Japan was
forced to either be the whipping boy in their international trade agreements
or adopt a Western modus operandi. Soon what had begun with Western
coercion to trade became a massive occidentalizing movement.
4
As the Japanese admired the authoritarianism of the German codes of
the time, they adopted a Civil, Commercial and Criminal Code drawn by
German legal scholars invited to Japan. Probably the greatest change,
legally, since these codes were drawn (1907) was the American occupation
following World War II. During this time an American-style (democratic)
'Johnson, The Japanese Legal Milieu and Its Relationship to Business, 13 AM. Bus. L.J. 337
(1976) quoting I J. WIGMORE, LAW AND JUSTICE IN TOKUGAWA JAPAN 40, 43 (1969).
'Japan, due to many factors, was being blackmailed into adopting a Western system. The
Japanese found themselves constantly the subservient party in adhesion contracts for trade.
Most well known of the legal problems which motivated the Japanese to accept Western cul-
ture was the extraterritoriality clauses in treaties which made a foreigner in Japan immune
from prosecution by Japanese authorities for crimes committed while in Japan.
600 INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
constitution with separation of powers principles was drawn and adopted
and sweeping reforms of the judiciary undertaken.
In spite of the recent avalanche of Western style accoutrements, Japanese
philosophical roots have not been substantially affected. As these codes
(i.e., the Western mentality) were premised upon individual rights and the
individual as the primary social unit, the fundamental element from the
Japanese perspective was the community and the unwritten laws of social
interaction. Modern Japan shows this schizophrenia. Though it has codes
specifying rules for varying situations, a curious compromise occurs when
the propensity to follow the unspoken law meets the written law.
Philosophical Underpinning
The two fundamental processes, which integrated, appear to explain the
modern Japanese mind are the national ethnic cohesion and the Confucian
conception of the world as an organic whole following certain immutable
laws (Dao) which men must work to follow. As the elements of nature act
together, thus men too must act together as an organic whole.
Early on, Confucianism emphasized jen as a basic virtue. Jen can be
translated as compassion, human-heartedness or man-to-man-ness. "Man
achievesjen through the reiationship (italics mine) which he has with other
members of the society." 5 The practical effect of this principle was to
emphasize intuitive understanding of men and phenomena and to deem-
phasize logical and abstract rules. For the Japanese the concrete world was
the foremost concern.
The spirit of harmony and concord was expressed in the virtue of wa. If
people abided by wa, disputes would not arise. It is one's duty to avoid
discord. En is the principle of social tie. The net effect of these two princi-
ples gives the Japanese mind a very different perspective than the West-
erner. Maintaining the relationship bound together by these two forces is
the paramount concern. As the existence of personal rights is a frontal
assault on maintaining this delicate balance, to insist or demand one's rights
or even a duty owed to one violates tacit rules of relationship etiquette. For
centuries, from the Confucian philosophy of paternal law, the Japanese
have characterized their duties and obligations among one another as
dependent upon relative social status. Girl is the term denoting the manner
of behavior required of one person to another in consequence of his social
status. Ninjo is the human affection which each person must exercise
toward others. Frequently, the Japanese will refer to giri-ninyo. This is the
natural dignity with which one encounters another without according him
any particular set of rights. It implies love and benevolence. Ho (from
horitsu) is the law or the body of legal rules. Even within this concept of
the body of legal rules there is no connotation of person rights. One must
'Kim and Lawson, The Law of the Subtle Mind- The Traditional Japanese Conception of
Law, 28 INT'L COMp. L.Q. 494 (1979).
The American Negotiator in Japan
understand that this mutual dignity is the criticalfactor when negotiating with
a Japanese businessman andpervades most transactions.6 For an obligee to
insist on duties another owes him, whether these duties resulted from long-
standing tradition or from a formal contract, is an insult to the obligor of
the duty. By doing so, the obligee would violate his own gir.
7
When a dispute arises the relationship functions as the dispute-settling
mechanism. A dispute represents a straying from the proper conduct which
the two should maintain toward one another. The solution lies within
themselves, as relative to one another they must understand what their
duties are and seek to replace the conflict with the peace they have dis-
turbed. This requires that the two actively participate in molding a solution
which answers the peculiar needs of their relationship. Just as life is infi-
nitely varied, so too are people and their problems. To apply a code of
rules which arose from individual minds under a particular set of circum-
stances to solve an unforeseeable dispute is ridiculous. The two parties
know the situation best and they are most capable of hewing out a compro-
mise. Introducing a third party arbitrator, unless he is familiar with the
circumstances, is almost as absurd. Hence, resorting to outside arbiters
throws the dispute into a subject-object realm, reducing the degree of sub-
jectivity on which the solution is based. For the Japanese:
Dispute resolutions techniques must be flexible enough to embrace the detail and
the uniqueness of any of life's infinitely varied relationships.
8
For these reasons Japanese are reluctant to sue in court. As the dispute
stems from a lost harmony it is the parties' responsibility to revitalize it.
The petitioner is shouting to the world that his adversary is violating natu-
ral harmony so severely that he is beyond reaching a solution by mutual
discussion. The adversary of the petitioner is thus an unworthy or perhaps
even abnormal person.
It is precisely to this aversion to objectivity that the Japanese antipathy
towards logic can be traced.
Life is an organic whole to be accepted and lived as it is; it is not to be cut by logic
into analytically neat pieces, for to do so is artificial and removed from the natu-
ral state of things.9
The Japanese Conception of Contract and Conciliation
Prior to walking into the negotiating room it is imperative that the Amer-
ican negotiator realize the modem result of the foregoing cultural factors.
The relationship is the ultimate arbiter of the success or failure of the trans-
'In light of this one can easily understand the reason for the custom of bowing.
'A feeling of dishonor and loss of face is the punishment for violating one's own giri.
'Kim and Lawson supra note 5 at 507.
91d at page 496 quoting from Kawashima, The Status of the Individual in the Notion oLaw,
Right and Social Order in Japan in THE STATUS OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN EAST AND WEST (C.
Moore, ed., 1968) at p. 432.
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action. For an American the regulations and contingency mechanisms in
the contract are the guide by which the parties deal throughout the transac-
tion. The American characterizes the quality of the relationship as good or
bad relative to the other party's adherence to the contract's requirements.
(See Figure 1.) The Japanese, however, see their actions as being based on
... a pre-existing relationship so that agreed upon directions or rules reflect
what the parties expect to occur as a result of the relationship. '0 (See Figure 2.)
Figure 1
One author has even suggested that placing such importance on the rela-
tionship can be traced back to the Buddhist originated concept of en. " En
is the principle that social relationships are predestined by the past lives of
individuals. Persons who thus are contracting parties were predestined to
their relationship and the meeting is not a coincidental occurrence. Con-
'°Guittard, Negotiating and Administering an International Sales Contract with the Japanese,
8 INT'L LAw. 822 (1974).
"Kim and Lawson supra note 9 at 502, quoting from Kawashima.
The American Negotiator in Japan
Figure 2
Japanese Outlook: The relationship is paramount: The
relationship exists as both the cement which binds us
together and as the reservoir from which we draw
strength to reach a mutually satisfying decision.
Contract is Vague
CONTRACT
Contract is a reference tool defining
outer bounds of agreement.
sidering en, giri-ninjo 12 and the community orientation, it is not hard to see
why the relationship operates as the vivifying principle in any intercourse.
To negotiate with a Japanese requires that one consider the Japanese eth-
nology as the frame of reference. Approaching the negotiations with this in
mind will enable one to avoid serious misinterpretation and insult which
could doom the discussion before it commences.
To streamline a successful transaction one's emphasis, too, must shift to
the relationship. If you as an American nourish the relationship, a healthy
transaction should result. As might be expected the vital nutrients are
mutuality and sincerity. The Japanese person, in the initial encounter, will
take an inventory of his potential business associate. He will be acquaint-
ing himself with attitudes and personalities. Jun Mori in his article "The
Practitioner's Perspective on Negotiations and Communications with Japa-
nese Businessmen" states that at this stage the Japanese businessman wants
to
forge a relatively durable and enduring relationship with the other party, tying
their companies together with informal understandings and agreements.
Ultimately the Japanese party would like to cultivate
a commercial loyalty strong enough to survive the types of disputes common to
commercial transactions; yet resilient enough to enable the parties to settle such
disputes by mutual agreement and compromise without resorting to litigation.13
"As mentioned girl defines the relative social status of each person and ninjo operates to
inject all relations with human affection.
"Muri, The Practitioner's Perspective on Negotiations and Communications with Japanese
Businessmen 47, 48 in CURRENT LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN AND EAST
ASIA (1978).
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As the Japanese party's thinking begins to sculpt the relationship toward
this goal, the American party should not do anything which might inhibit
this or put his veracity or sincerity in question.
There is one crucial ramification for constructing a contract which arises
from this relationship-dependent approach. Domestic American contracts
function because a person feels bound to perform that which the law
requires. This concept is the principle of vinculumjuris, the Roman defini-
tion of a legal obligation. 14 The Japanese have no equivalent. In Japan it
would be a serious moral violation if one were to insist that another must
perform a duty owed to the person. The person insisting would violate his
own giri-ninjo. There is no need for the person to whom the duty is owed to
insist on its execution. A person who owes the duty to another is under a
strict moral obligation to fulfill it (pursuant to his giri-ninjo).15
The upshot of this is that including lengthy clauses in a contract regulat-
ing performance and covering innumerable contingencies is both ridiculous
and insulting. It is ridiculous in that no person can possibly make a solu-
tion in the present for a problem which has not yet arisen. The circum-
stances and possible combinations of variables are too indeterminate and
numerous to predict and a solution should be found only at the time of
dispute. The clauses are insulting in that the party does not have enough
confidence and belief in the relationship to count on the goodwill of the
other and the strength of the relationship to achieve a compromise. Having
faith in the relationship and a respectful dignity for your associate will
enable both parties to fashion a mutually satisfying solution. As a matter of
course the Japanese include in their contracts what is known as the Round
Solution Clause:
If in the future a dispute arises between the parties with regard to the rights and
duties provided in this contract, the parties will confer in goodfaith (italics mine).
(sei-i o motte kyogi suru);
or, in a similar situation:
... will settle the dispute harmoniously by consultation. (kyogi ni yori enman ni
kaiketsu suIrt). 16
A written contract to the Japanese is a statement of the perimeter of the
transaction. Typically the contents are very vague and amorphous. The
day of signing is probably the last time the Japanese party will look at it.
The main purpose of the contract to the Japanese party is to establish the
relationship between him and his business associate. Thus, it is of no prac-
tical worth in solving disputes. The strength of the relationship and good
will and mutual concern of the parties will solve these.
"'BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed.).
"Though at first glance, to the Westerner, this manner of internal enforcement must seem
quite tenuous, it could be successfully contended that it is not that different from a religious
belief by which many Westerners regulate their lives and perform duties owed to one another.
"Kim and Lawson supra note 5 at 510 quoting Kawashima, The Legal Consciousness of
Contract in Japan, (1974) 7 LAW IN JAPAN: AN ANNUAL I at pp. 6-7.
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Across the Negotiating Table
The following are some guidelines for discussion, agreement and
disagreement.
1. Before negotiations, greet every person of the party and chat with
them. The first hour should be spent by chatting with the others, sharing
ideas and trivia. Sharing food and drink is also advisable. This helps to
dissolve adversarial feelings and builds an atmosphere of trust and mutual
concern.
2. Do not hurry negotiations. You should hasten slowly. It will be
exasperating for you and unnerving for your Japanese counterpart if you
are trying to engineer an agreement according to a schedule. Plan to spend
a lot of time discussing and clarifying.
3. Japanese are suspicious of a negotiating lawyer. The Japanese have
the same opinion of foreign lawyers as they do of their own lawyers, that is,
that lawyers are single-minded advocates who are only interested in gaining
for their clients. This of course excludes the mutual trust and willingness of
a party to accommodate. The persons you will be dealing with almost cer-
tainly will not be lawyers. Keep a low legal profile.
4. Clarify the official position and authority possessed by your counter-
part. Chances are your counterpart will be an older man as they are the
most experienced at solving problems. Normally negotiators will not have
authority to finalize contract terms. Discover their authority early on. This
may be done by an exchange of business cards and polite inquiry as to
authority.' 7
5. Clarify your authority to the Japanese negotiator. Normally as a
lawyer you will have power to finalize a contract. It will help negotiations
if the Japanese negotiator understands this.
6. Be prepared for a tough negotiation. Japanese negotiators are usu-
ally well prepared and experienced. Expect sessions to continue well into
the night and on weekends. You may find that fatigue is more difficult to
deal with than the problem at hand.
7. Do not sour the atmosphere. It is most important that the Japanese
feel that you can be trusted. Encourage candor. Talk about motives and
long-term intentions.
8. Do not dominate negotiations. Remember that mutuality and
accommodation are to be stressed and you cannot possibly know what your
counterpart would like if you do all the talking. It may be wise to isolate
points and explain them very slowly to guarantee that they are understood.
'"Your counterpart may be a representative director. Japanese law requires that a company
appoint one or more of these directors to represent the company to third parties. The repre-
sentative director can bind the Japanese company in contracts. The director's authority to bind
the company is verifiable by checking the corporation's registration. Article 262 of the Japa-
nese Commercial Code permits a third party to assume that any officer with the title of presi-
dent, vice president or managing director is a representative director.
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You should then be silent and await the response. This should assure
mutual exchange.
9. Do not press a point with too much force. Always maintain a respect
for the negotiator. You are trying to reach a mutually constructed solution,
not force feed him one. You will appear to be pursuing a selfish course of
action if you do.
10. Do not flatly reject a suggested proposal. You cannot categorically
reject a proposition and maintain an atmosphere of mutuality, sincerity and
a willingness to compromise. You will be labeled as an unworthy person to
do business with over any length of time. The Japanese do not like winners
and losers. The concept is antithetical to their culture. When you flatly
reject a proposal you have shifted the discussion into the realm of winning
and losing. From your perspective it may seem expeditious to lay your
cards on the table. By doing so however you will have failed to treat your
counterpart with the respect due him which should flow from your mutual
concern. Rarely will the Japanese negotiator give a direct answer. He will
say no to your proposal in several indirect ways: (a) prolonged inactivity;
(b) a discussion of deficiencies in the proposal; (c) a suggestion that there
are better alternatives; (d) mere failure to follow up on a proposal. I8 Learn
from these examples.
11. Do not expect immediate answers to proposals you suggest. You
will be answered with noncommital acknowledgments expressing neither
encouragement nor acquiescence. The negotiator probably does not have
the power to make final decisions. The final decisions will be collective
ones. This is known as the Ringoshi System. It is the:
Japanese method of decision-making whereby decisions are formulated at mid-
dle- or lower-management levels and through a series of discussions and placing
of seals. The discussions find their way up the ladder right to the top where they
are given the final go ahead and implemented. 19
During the process the Japanese will delay and give you broad noncommit-
tal agreements. These are good signs. By a group decision errors are
reduced. If one occurs no one in particular will be to blame. You can
assuage yourself while you are waiting that once a proposal is accepted it
can be initiated rather rapidly as the Japanese were also considering imple-
mentation problems.
12. Designate a contact. Designate one position (e.g., General Counsel)
to whom all correspondence is to be addressed. This will limit the risk of
lost correspondence and expedite communication.
13. "We note your point." You will frequently hear this sentence from
the Japanese. It means that they are planning to present a written response
'"These four responses are mentioned by Mori, supra note 13 at 50.
"Vaughn, Introduction to Joint Venturing in Japan, 6 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 189 (1974).
The American Negotiator in Japan
at the next negotiating session and it would be pointless to discuss the mat-
ter until then.20
14. Finalize all specific agreements in writing. The Japanese will scruti-
nize the wording of the agreement. The document will be changed repeat-
edly and be subject to clarification and alteration up until the moment of
signature. Expect any proposed boilerplate language to be revised to death.
Sometimes a Japanese negotiator will fail to include a certain matter in the
contract even though it is very important to him. You must ferret out this
sentiment. He believes that these points will be solved to his satisfaction
later by conciliation and compromise. 2'
15. Let the Japanese handle negotiations with their government. Gov-
ernment approval will always be necessary. The relations among business,
banks and government is different from those in the United States. The
Japanese company will understand this and will be familiar with the vari-
ous ministries which require any domestic enterprise anticipating a joint
venture or importation of foreign capital to report to the government. In
Japan the government regulates industry more stringently than in the
United States and it is primarily done through indirect intimidation and
appeals to national good. In Japan it is known as gyosei shido (administra-
tive guidance).
16. When dispute arises---conciliate. When a dispute arises, chances
are that the contract over which you gruelingly negotiated will be lying in
the bottom drawer of the counterpart's file cabinet. Now is the critical time
when the strength of the relationship will be tested. You must adjust and
accommodate. Exercise mutual reasonableness and compromise. Do not
start talking about rights and obligations. Keep emphasizing the objective
that you both want to reach and how you both want to reach it. Remember
that you want to maintain an atmosphere of conciliation and respect. If
you have provisions covering this dispute and they will work a hardship on
the other party, you should not strictly enforce them. You will be consid-
ered morally deficient if you do. Your most valuable business asset when
dealing with the Japanese is a reputation for reasonableness and fairness.
Leave Machiavelli in the sixteenth century. Otherwise you may win the
battle but lose the war.
17. Keep records of correspondence. A record of all correspondence,
memoranda, telephone calls and minutes of meetings, etc., should be kept
in chronological order. This is essential when certifying any extracontrac-
tual commitments.
r'Guittard, Negotiating and Administering an International Sales Contract with the Japanese,
8 INT'L LAW. at 822, 829 (1974).
"If your company is importing/exporting products to or from a Japanese company which
deals with other Japanese companies with which you are in competition there is one clause in
your contract on which you should insist. Insert in your contract a provision entitling you to
the same flexibility due to changes and unforeseen circumstances that the Japanese companies
have. The clause provides that should a change in circumstances occur such that performance
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The Business Entity
Now aware of the delicate cultural differences and utilizing the negotiat-
ing suggestions let us assume that you, as CST Systems' negotiator, and two
representative directors from Yoshimura have signed the following:
AGREEMENT
1. Both CST Systems and Yoshimura will be organizers of a company to be
located in Japan;
2 The business will be a joint venture, ordinary stock corporation or kabushiki
kaisha;
3. The corporation's name will be The Japamafon Corporation;
4. The purpose of Japamafon will be to manufacture audio components utiliz-
ing the wireless transmission principle;
5. Both CST Systems and Yoshimura will provide capitalization as follows: 50
percent Yoshimura and 50 percent CST Systems; Initial Capitalization:
V444.4 million or $2 million (U.S.) dollars, Y222.2 million (cash), Y 111.1 mil-
lion (cash) or $500,000 (U.S.) dollars; Licensing Agreement to Japamafon for
Wireless Design; Net worth: Y 111.1 million;
6. Five thousand shares of Class A stock are to be authorized and 3,500 issued;
5,000 shares of Class B stock are to be authorized and 3,500 issued;
7. Both classes of stock are to have the same par value ($10.00 (U.S.): Y2222)
per share; Class A stock will elect a total of two directors; Class B stock will
elect a total of four directors;
8. CST Systems is to have the right of first refusal to purchase any share of
Class A stock to be issued; Yoshimura is to have the right of first refusal to
purchase any share of Class B stock to be issued. Transfer of shares may only
proceed with approval of a majority of the Board of Directors. Cumulative
voting unless specifically authorized is prohibited;
9. Deposit of initial capitalization-funds is to be made on March 25, 1982 at the
Bank of Japan, I Chase Manhattan Plaza, New York City, New York, in an
account in the name of Japamafon Corporation to be opened on that day.
The licensing agreement for the transmission technology will also be trans-
ferred to Japamafon that same day;
10. In the event of future dispute between Yoshimura and CST Systems with
regard to the rights and duties provided in this agreement the parties will
confer in good faith. 22
Basis of U.S.-Japanese Commercial Relations
The U.S.-Japanese Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation of
1953 serves as the framework of U.S.-Japanese commercial relations. The
portion of the treaty covering the circumstances here is article VII par. 1:23
Nationals and companies of either party shall be accorded national treatment
with respect to engaging in all types of commercial, industrial, financial and other
business activities within the territories of the other Party. . . . Accordingly such
nationals and companies shall be permitted within such territories: (a) to estab-
lish and maintain branches, agencies, their business; (b) to organize companies
under the general company laws of such other Party, and to acquire majority inter-
of the obligation would result in a significant deterioration of your financial position you may
refuse to perform while giving the Japanese company no recourse. Id at 825.
"Exchange Rate: Y222.2 = $1.00 (U.S.) dollar.
"Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, April 2, 1953, Japan-U.S., art. VII par.
1, 4 U.S.T. 2063, T.I.A.S. No. 2863.
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ests in companies of such other Party; and (c) to conduct and manage enterprises
which they have established or acquired (italics mine).
Legally each nation must only minimally interfere in the investment by one
party in the business of the nationals of the other party. However, this is
not actually the case. One must understand the fragility of the Japanese
business environment. Historically the government of Japan has subsidized
industrial growth. The result is the Japanese version of the American con-
glomerate or the keiretsu (formerly zaibatsu). Presently the government
through its ministries and councils and its influences over the Bank of
Japan oversees industrial development. Being a relatively small country,
Japan has had to keep a careful watch over the expansion of monstrous
Western industries and prevent them from overrunning domestic business
and usurping the government's control.
Administrative Guidance and Foreign Exchange
The objective of the Japanese business/government duo is to control the
flow of foreign funds into and out of Japan. As mentioned the Japanese
government influences business by way of gyosei shido or administrative
guidance. As would be expected gyosei shido is the indirect means that the
government, through its administrative agencies, uses to enforce its national
trade, monetary and investment policy. It has many nuances and is success-
ful due to the Japanese' respect for their government. One author defined it
to be:24
The action of an administrative organ, in respect to matters within a certain
administrative field, in executing statutes by applying them and in ordering
strong measures against and otherwise compelling specific individuals, juristic
persons and associations; where there is voluntary compliance and a statutory
basis of action, in guiding, suggesting and advising; and where there is voluntary
compliance but no statutory basis of action, in influencing theparties voluntary coop-
eration and consensualper/ormance by expressing, as an administrative organ, the
expectation and wish that something should exist or be done in a certain way (italics
mine).
The ministries which will review Yoshimura's application for a joint ven-
ture would be: (1) the Foreign Investment Council (FIC); (2) the Ministry
of International Trade and Investment (MITI); (3) the Ministry of Finance
(MOF); (4) the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA); and possibly (5) the
Bank of Japan (BOJ).25
'Johnson, The Japanese Legal Milieu and Its Relation to Business, 13 AM. Bus. L.J. 342
(1976) quoting from Narita, Administrative Guidance, 2 L. JAPAN 45 (1968).
"As most Japanese commercial banks are in debt to the Bank of Japan, ultimately BOJ has
the final word on lending. The BOJ is closely allied with the government. The money supply
(Ms) in Japan is tight. One reason is that Japanese banks maintain a low loan:deposit ratio.
Because money is difficult to get and the securities markets are relatively inactive, it is not
uncommon for the debt:equity ratio of main Japanese businesses to be greater than 3:1. Hence
with money difficult to get and the main source (BOJ) being a close government ally, the
government via its ministries controls investments.
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Validation
Article VII of the 1953 treaty notwithstanding, the Japanese government
has adopted a national policy to prevent foreign business from overrunning
Japan. Under pressure from foreign governments to be more lenient in per-
mitting foreign investment, the Japanese implemented a policy of liberal-
ized foreign investment. The government categorized industries and listed
rules dictating the permissible amount of foreign investment and ownership
in these industries. Thus, when a foreign company wishes to export capital
to Japan to invest, the ministries use these criteria to make their judgment.
The two main laws which, combined, cover the majority of situations are
the Foreign Investment Law (the Law Concerning Foreign Investment) 26
and the Foreign Exchange Law. The specific percentages of ownership per-
mitted are set out in the industry's category and vary from 0-100 percent
foreign ownership. However, it would be rare when a foreign investor
would receive permission to hold a majority interest in a domestic com-
pany. This is the reason for the provisions in CST's agreement with
Yoshimura giving Yoshimura control of Japamafon via the board of direc-
tors. If a request for validation falls within one of the liberalized categories
and is within the percentage ownership requirements, an affirmative answer
from the government would be received within a month. This is known as
automatic validation. If the proposal fell within a more strictly regulated
category, the decision would be drawn out over a much longer period with
recurrent negotiations. If the industry was restricted, the proposal would be
rejected. One familiar rationale for rejecting investment proposals is that
"... the investment would have an exceptionally detrimental effect on the
interests of Japan. ' 27 This in effect would delay the issuance of a foreign
exchange license which is necessary to import capitalization funds and
export dividends or income. The Japanese in the past have repeatedly
resorted to using a balance of payments argument as their overt rationale to
refuse a license. The argument proceeds along these lines: At the time of
application for the license the Japanese government refused issuance
because it was necessary
... to prevent its monetary reserves from falling to a very low level or to effect a
moderate increase in very low monetary reserves. 28
However, when Japan joined the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) in 1963, the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) became the watchdog for foreign investors and presently, unless
16This is Article 1I of the Japanese Uniform Commercial Code. It gives the Japanese gov-
ernment authority to permit or prevent, by validation, acquisition of shares in a Japanese
company or a joint venture by foreign investor.
"Birmingham, The Japanese Corporation as a Business Vehiclefor Foreign Business from
CURRENT LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN AND EAST ASIA 52 (1978).
"Japan-U.S. Treaty of 1953 supra note 23 at art. XII, par. I1.
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Japan convinces the IMF that a monetary crisis exists, Japan may not
impose controls on direct inward investment.29
When the government ministries review the Yoshimura/CST Systems
proposal, it will probably find the critical criteria met: (1) the industry per-
mits foreign investment and (2) the Japanese company Yoshimura main-
tains control though stock ownership is equally divided.
Conclusion
When a Westerner deals with a Westerner, though negotiation can be
exasperating and trying, both parties share the same primary underlying
assumptions of profit motive, past negotiation experience and attitude
toward litigation. However, when dealing with the East Asians, those
assumptions are different. Using occidental assumptions to negotiate with
Orientals is not unlike playing poker with an opponent who is using the
rules of blackjack. Misunderstanding will be a foregone conclusion and
agreement as likely as a wooly mammoth. Hence it is necessary to familiar-
ize oneself with cultural idiosyncrasies before attempting to hammer out
intricate and sensitive issues. In the hypothetical agreement just reviewed
familiarization with the Japanese attitude toward aggressive bargaining,
indirect refusal and the requirement that disputes be settled through concil-
iation are prerequisites to successful business and legal negotiations.
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